The concept of a communal type of privacy shared by interconnected social groups has wide applications in the healthcare field, specifically in genetic testing and genetic data privacy (Pyrrho, Cam...

Los ejes categoriales que vertebran los artículos reunidos en este dossier colaboran, desde diversas perspectivas, en discusiones y revisiones teórico-prácticas operadas en el siglo XX y profundizadas en el presente desde las humanidades y las ciencias sociales en América Latina y el Caribe. Cada uno de los trabajos se escapa, en sus desarrollos, a la homologación directa de los conceptos propuestos: EXISTENCIAS/CUERPOS/COMUNIDAD. Los tres conceptos implican la necesidad y voluntad epistémico-política de abordar la singularidad de la existencia y de los (...) cuerpos con la pluralidad de las formas de vida. En este sentido, los aportes de cada uno de los colaboradores son significativos. (shrink)

This research examines the association between attitudes on cheating and cognitive moral development. In this research, we use Rest's (1979a) Defining Issues Test, the Attitudes on Honesty Scale (Authors) and Academic Integrity Index (Authors); the last two are adaptations of the DIT. A total of 220 students from three universities participated in the study (66 psychology majors and 154 business majors). The data indicate that 66.4 percent of the students reported that they cheated in high school, college, or both high (...) school and college. Psychology majors scored higher than business majors on both the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979a) and the Attitudes on Honesty Scale (AHS, Authors). Using factor analysis, we found significant associations between students' ratings of the importance considerations present in the three cheating scenarios and their estimates of whether cheating would occur (i.e., the Academic Integrity Index). Finally, using logistic regression, we found that the scores on the Attitudes on Honesty Scale and Academic Integrity Index associate with the self-reported cheating behavior of college students. (shrink)

According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This paper aims to fill this gap. It offers a precise characterisation of assertoric commitment, and shows how it can be applied to define assertion. On the proposed view, acquiring commitment is (...) not sufficient for asserting. To assert, commitment must be acquired by explicitly presenting a proposition as true. (shrink)

An alternative approach to analyze the nonrelativistic quantum dynamics of a rigid and extended charged particle taking into account the radiation reaction is discussed with detail. Interpretation of the field operators as annihilation and creation ones, theory of perturbations and renormalization are not used. The analysis is carried out in the Heisenberg picture with the electromagnetic field expanded in a complete orthogonal basis set of functions which allows the electromagnetic field to satisfy arbitrary boundary conditions. The corresponding coefficients are the (...) field operators which satisfy the usual commutation relations. A nonlinear equation of motion for the charged particle is obtained. A careful consideration of the quantum effects allows the derivation of a linear equation of motion which is free of both runaway solutions and preacceleration, even for a point charge. Also, the electromagnetic mass, which is defined as the coefficient of the acceleration operator, vanishes for a point particle. However, this does not mean that the results are free of ambiguities which are exhibited and discussed. (shrink)

In this paper the analysis of the classical dynamics of a charged particle is carried out without considering that the electromagnetic field necessarily goes to zero at infinity. A quite general non-linear equation of motion is obtained for an extended charged particle valid for any distribution of charge in the particle and for an electromagnetic field satisfying any boundary conditions. Some common approximations are analyzed with detail to determine how the usual difficulties arise.

Speech acts are governed by a variety of illocutionary norms. Building on Sbisà’s (2019) work, this chapter attempts to develop a common framework to study them. Four families of illocutionary rules are identified: (i) Validity rules set conditions for (actual) performance; (ii) Cooperative rules set conditions for cooperative performance; (iii) Illocutionary goals set conditions for successful performance; (iv) Illocutionary obligations set conditions for compliance. Illocutionary rules are often taken to play a constitutive role: speech acts are said to be constituted (...) by the unique set of rules that regulates them. Against this view, it is argued that many illocutionary rules are instead best construed as rationally derivable expectations of cooperation. This alternative paradigm provides fertile ground to reconcile scholarly disagreement between speech act theorists, and yields a promising explanation of how illocutionary norms are learned and evolve through time. (shrink)

The New Economic Windows Series, derived from Massimo Salzano's ideas and work, incorporates material from textbooks, monographs and conference proceedings that deals with both the theoretical and applied aspects of various sub-disciplines ...

Can fictions lie? According to a classic conception, works of fiction cannot contain lies, since their content is neither presented as true nor meant to deceive us. But this classic view can be challenged. Sometimes fictions appear to make claims about the actual world, and these claims can be designed to convey falsehoods, historical misconceptions, and pernicious stereotypes. Should we conclude that some fictional statements are lies? This article presents two views that support a positive answer, and two that support (...) a negative one. After examining various ways in which fictions can deceive, it concludes in favour of the view that fictional statements can mislead, but never lie. (shrink)

Herpes simplex virus (HSV)‐derived vectors are currently being developed for the introduction of foreign DNA into neurons. HSV vectors can facilitate a range of molecular studies on postmitotic neurons and may ultimately be used for somatic cell gene therapy for certain neurologic diseases. In this article, the salient features of the pathogenesis and molecular biology of HSV relevant to its use as a vector are described, along with an overview of the methods used to derive these vectors. The accomplishments which (...) have been made to date using the HSV vector system are discussed, with emphasis on the issues of this technology which remain to be addressed. HSV has the potential to be a most useful tool for neuronal cell transgenesis and it is likely that important neurobiological questions will be answered using this vector system. (shrink)

What is considered normal determines clinical practice in medicine and has implications at an individual level, doctor-patient relationship and health care policies. With the increase in medical information and technical abilities it is urgent to have a clear concept of normality in medicine so that crucial discussions can be held with unequivocal terms.The different meanings for normality were analyzed throughout the literature and grouped according to their relevance in the academic community in models, namely the Biostatistical Theory (BST), Health, Ideal, (...) Process and Biological advantage. The BST is the most established naturalistic approach, however normal variability can arguably constitute a problem. Health is similar and raises the question of setting the boundaries of pathology. Normality as an Ideal is an useful tool but is naturally unrealistic. As a Process it is comprehensible but is hard to frame for practical purposes. If considered as a Biological Advantage, seems intuitive but abnormality should tend to disappear.After, three examples were presented to discuss these models. They were Anemia, Psychiatric diseases and Psychopathy. In the case of Anemia the BST was applied and the arbitrary boundaries but with social impact were exposed. Psychiatric diseases was discussed under the process of self-organization and non-suffering ideal. With Psychopathy the boundaries of biological advantage are questioned.This review appeals to the importance of redesigning of the concept of normality in medicine according to current times and stresses the importance of integrating concepts such as variability and autonomy. (shrink)

In order to understand the rise of runaway solutions in the radiation reaction problem a mechanical model is used. An alternative demonstration of Daboul’s theorem, through Hurwitz’s criterion, is given. The origin of runaway solutions in electrodynamics is discussed. They arise when the particle has a negative mechanical mass or when approximations are used in the equation of motion. In the 1-dimensional mechanical model an exact and linear equation of motion for the particle is obtained, the corresponding exact solution is (...) again runaway when the mechanical mass is negative. The exact solution is not runaway when the mechanical mass is positive. However, the use of approximations leads to an equation of motion which has runaway solutions. It is exhibited that the use of approximations in the 3-dimensional mechanical model is completely necessary because the general equation of motion for the particle is non-linear. The analysis of this case proceeds in a very similar way to the one carried out in electrodynamics. This means that the number of dimensions also plays an important role in the analysis. (shrink)

Psychonarratology is an approach to the empirical study of literary response and the processing of narrative. It draws on the empirical methodology of cognitive psychology and discourse processing as well as the theoretical insights and conceptual analysis of literary studies, particularly narratology. The present work provides a conceptual and empirical basis for this interdisciplinary approach that is accessible to researchers from either disciplinary background. An integrative review is presented of the classic problems in narratology: the status of the narrator, events (...) and plot, characters and characterization, speech and thought, and focalization. For each area, Bortolussi and Dixon critique the state of the art in narratology and literary studies, discuss relevant work in cognitive psychology, and provide a new analytical framework based on the insight that readers treat the narrator as a conversational participant. Empirical evidence is presented on each problem, much of it previously unpublished. (shrink)

This paper critically investigates the implementation of the UN guiding principles on business and human rights (UNGPs) into the corporate setting through the concept of ‘translation’. In the decade since the creation of the UNGPs, little academic research has focussed specifically on the corporate implementation of human rights. Drawing on qualitative case studies of two multinational corporations—an oil and gas company and a bank—this paper unpacks how human rights are translated into the corporate context. In doing so, the paper focuses (...) on the “resonance dilemma” translators encounter, the strategies used to make human rights understandable and palatable, and the difficulties that emerge from this process. We contend that the process of making human rights understandable and manageable can change their form and content, which may act as an obstacle to human rights realisation and corporate accountability for human rights. (shrink)

This paper analyses the communicative and epistemic value of retweeting (and more generally of reposting content on social media). Against a naïve view, it argues that retweets are not acts of endorsement, motivating this diagnosis with linguistic data. Retweeting is instead modelled as a peculiar form of quotation, in which the reported content is indicated rather than reproduced. A relevance-theoretic account of the communicative import of retweeting is then developed, to spell out the complex mechanisms by which retweets achieve their (...) communicative goals. The last section outlines the epistemic threats posed by the increasing prevalence of retweeting on social media, linking them to the low reputational, cognitive and practical costs linked to this emerging form of communication. (shrink)

In this study, we examine the accounts of 30 white middle- and upper-class female heroin/methadone users. Using a resistance framework, we note that these women recall their initial heroin use in ways that suggest rejection of restrictive gender and class expectations. Using a dynamic view of resistance, we begin to understand how these women attempt to resist the dominant discourse through their heroin use and to reinterpret their experiences with heroin.

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...) given illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker intends not to Φ , or believes that he will not Φ , or both. In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to deceive the addressee into believing that p. (shrink)

There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, (...) and finds independent support from general considerations about the differences between rules and aims. (shrink)

In a series of articles (Pagin, 2004, 2009), Peter Pagin has argued that assertion is not a social speech act, introducing a method (which we baptize ‘the P-test’) designed to refute any account that defines assertion in terms of its social effects. This paper contends that Pagin's method fails to rebut the thesis that assertion is social. We show that the P-test is both unreliable (because it overgenerates counterexamples) and counterproductive (because it ultimately provides evidence in favor of some social (...) accounts). Nonetheless, we contend that assertion is not fully social. We defend an intermediate view according to which assertion is only a partly social speech act: assertions both commit the speaker to a proposition (a social component) and present their propositional content as true (a non-social component). The upshot is that assertion is in some important respect social, although it cannot be defined solely in terms of its social effects. (shrink)

The article intends to show that MacIntyre’s notion of friendship (which, according to him, would be a reappropriation of Aristotle’s notion of philia), while ignoring the political aspect explicitly emphasized by Aristotle, reduces the notion of friendship to its social or civic aspect, thereby weakening the political nature of man.

According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of assertion is subject to a single 'constitutive' rule, that takes the form: "One must: assert that p only if p has C". Scholars working on assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is 'constitutive' in different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we understand (...) the full import of assuming that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule, it becomes clear that some fundamental assumptions of the current debate are mistaken, and others unwarranted. (shrink)

Following a discourse analysis approach this study examines triadic encounters of nine medical consultations carried out in an outpatient cancer clinic in Santiago, Chile involving an oncologist, a patient and a patient’s companion. Consultations are fully transcribed and analysed to understand the participatory roles patients’ companions play in the medical exchanges. In addition, the type of linguistic functions associated with each role and the advantages or downsides of companions’ involvement in the encounters are also investigated. The analysis reveals seven prominent (...) roles that companions may engage in during the visits. These are studied in detail. The results show that although companions may not always provide information that is consistent with the patients’ views, they can be of great help. Relieving the patients of many daunting tasks, monitoring their well-being, establishing a partnership and bringing vital information to the clinic are instances where the controlling power that some may exercise in the medical encounter can be outweighed. (shrink)

Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts that can be lies and speech acts that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of (...) two normative components: ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired distinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases – the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies). It puts forward (...) a new definition to deal with these scalar parameters, that requires that the speaker asserts what he believes more likely to be false than true. The second section shows that statements are scalar in the same way beliefs are, and accounts for a further element of scalarity, illocutionary force. (shrink)

In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: 'descriptive accuracy' (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), and 'moral import' (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with (...) lying), vindicating the primacy of the former desideratum. Regarding (ii), it shows that Krauss' proposed 'worse-off requirement' meets neither of these desiderata, whereas the 'comparative insincerity condition' (Marsili 2014) can meet both. The conclusion is that lies are assertions that the speaker takes to be more likely to be false than true, and their distinctive blameworthiness is a function of the extent to which they violate a sincerity norm. (shrink)

How can we capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading? According to a traditional view, the difference boils down to whether the speaker is saying (as opposed to implying) something that they believe to be false. This view is subject to known objections; to overcome them, an alternative view has emerged. For the alternative view, what matters is whether the speaker can consistently deny that they are committed to knowing the relevant proposition. We point out serious flaws for this (...) alternative view, and sketch a simpler alternative that incorporates key insights of the traditional view. (shrink)

A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.

Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...) which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to define group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I offer a definition that drops condition (i) and significantly broadens condition (ii). (shrink)

Assertions are our standard communicative tool for sharing and acquiring information. Recent empirical studies seemingly provide converging evidence that assertions are subject to a factive norm: you are entitled to assert a proposition p only if p is true. All these studies, however, assume that we can treat participants' judgments about what an agent 'should say' as evidence of their intuitions about assertability. This paper argues that this assumption is incorrect, so that the conclusions drawn in these studies are unwarranted. (...) It shows that most people do not interpret statements about what an agent 'should say' as statements about assertability, but rather as statements about what is in the agent's interest to do. It identifies some effective measures to force the intended reading of statements about what an agent 'should say', and shows that when these measures are implemented, people's judgments consistently and overwhelmingly align with non-factive accounts of assertion. (shrink)

Can fictions make genuine assertions about the actual world? Proponents of the ‘Assertion View’ answer the question affirmatively: they hold that authors can assert, by means of explicit statements that are part of the work of fiction, that something is actually the case in the real world. The ‘Nonassertion’ View firmly denies this possibility. In this paper, I defend a nuanced version of the Nonassertion View. I argue that even if fictions cannot assert, they can indirectly communicate that what is (...) recounted as fictional is actually true. I show that this view is supported by independent linguistic data, and that it is able to defuse the objections that are typically raised against the Nonassertion View. I conclude by showing that this position has some interesting implications for testimonial cognitivism about fiction. (shrink)

In a recent book (_Lying and insincerity_, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground.

Is truth the rule or the aim of assertions? Philosophers disagree. After reviewing the available evidence, the hypothesis that truth is the aim of assertion is defended against recent attempts to prove that truth is rather a rule of assertion.

En ese artículo de naturaleza bibliográfica explicamos porque el diálogo intercientífico permite que se transcienda la homogeneidad de una epistemología involucrada en sí misma, expandiéndose para la transdisciplinariedad cultural y epistemológica. Analizamos dos nuevos modelos de paradigma alternativo, a saber: el vivir bien y el desarrollo endógeno sustentable. Consideramos que esas concepciones filosóficas tienen el desafío de desarrollar nuevas posibilidades epistemológicas y metodológicas que permitan el cambio de la realidad social e histórica. Palabras clave: Diálogo Intercientífico. Epistemología Transdisciplinar. Desarrollo Endógeno (...) Sustentable. Vivir Bien. (shrink)

In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of lies involving partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion, and presents a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second section (...) analyses assertions that express graded beliefs, exploring how mitigation and reinforcement can alter the insincerity conditions for lying. The last section considers the case of lies that attack certainty (knowledge-lies), understood as attempt to alter the hearer's graded beliefs. (shrink)

Odor naming is enhanced in communities where communication about odors is a central part of daily life (e.g., wine experts, flavorists, and some hunter‐gatherer groups). In this study, we investigated how expert knowledge and daily experience affect the ability to name odors in a group of experts that has not previously been investigated in this context—Iranian herbalists; also called attars—as well as cooks and laypeople. We assessed naming accuracy and consistency for 16 herb and spice odors, collected judgments of odor (...) perception, and evaluated participants' odor meta‐awareness. Participants' responses were overall more consistent and accurate for more frequent and familiar odors. Moreover, attars were more accurate than both cooks and laypeople at naming odors, although cooks did not perform significantly better than laypeople. Attars' perceptual ratings of odors and their overall odor meta‐awareness suggest they are also more attuned to odors than the other two groups. To conclude, Iranian attars—but not cooks—are better odor namers than laypeople. They also have greater meta‐awareness and differential perceptual responses to odors. These findings further highlight the critical role that expertise and type of experience have on olfactory functions. (shrink)

Reúne textos sobre a história e seu objeto, desde o século XVII até a contemporaneidade, compondo uma amostragem do que se tem trabalhado no âmbito da filosofia da história, mais expressivamente no Brasil.

This papers intends to show that Aristotle's theory on the political nature of man implies a specific difference in relation to other animals and that this does not arise from his understanding of human beings as naturally vulnerable animals that would seek in political life an artifice to redress their insufficiency or individual vulnerability to live. The qualitative difference of human beings in relation to other animals - including political species, such as bees or ants - drives them to an (...) equally specific type of life, whose foundation obeys values that ca be universalized. The political application of these values does not correspond to what is done in the domestic sphere, nor does it correspond to the mere transposition to a quantitatively superior community, because the universality of political values is extracted from what is understood by human beings as necessary for the realization of man as man, not man as an element of nature. (shrink)

Se analizan algunas consecuencias del escepticismo humeano concernientes a laexistencia de un Yo substancial y permanente anterior a la experiencia y coordinadorde ella. Se presentan dos propuestas: la teoría de los agregadosautoorganizativos favorecida por Francisco Varela y la tesis de las ideascognoscentes de William James. Luego se examinan tres problemas que suscitanposturas a-yoicas del tipo James-Varela: el problema de la identidad, el de latemporalidad y el de la intencionalidad como propósito. Se plantean algunassoluciones y se sugiere que la consideración de (...) un paradigma a-yoico está todavíasujeta a una filosofía especulativa.We analyze some implications of Humean scepticism regarding the existence of apermanent and substantial Self that would precede and coordinate experience.Two proposals are presented: Francisco Varela’s theory of selforganizingaggregates and William James’ thesis about ideas that know. We then examinethree problems raised by “no-self” stances of the James-Varela kind, viz., theproblems of identity, of temporality and of intentionality . We sketchsome solutions and we suggest that the consideration of a “no-self” paradigm isstill a matter of speculative philosophy. (shrink)

This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...) second part of the thesis, I consider these kinds of impropriety. An influential hypothesis maintains that proper assertions must meet a precise epistemic standard, and several philosophers have tried to identify this standard. After reviewing some difficulties for this approach, I provide an innovative solution to some known puzzles concerning the permissibility of false assertions. In my view, assertions purport to aim at truth, but they are not subject to a norm that requires speakers to assert a proposition only if it is true. (shrink)

Arguably, a theory of assertion should be able to provide (i) a definition of assertion, and (ii) a set of conditions for an assertion to be appropriate. This paper reviews two strands of theories that have attempted to meet this challenge. Commitment-based accounts à la Peirce define assertion in terms of commitment to the truth of the proposition. Restriction-based accounts à la Williamson define assertion in terms of the conditions for its appropriate performance. After assessing the suitability of these projects (...) to meet the desiderata of a theory of assertion, I argue that a speech act theoretic account à la Searle is more suitable for this purpose: it integrates the core intuitions of both restriction-based and commitment-based accounts while avoiding their respective problems, and has the further advantage of determining how assertion fits into a more general theory of illocutionary acts. (shrink)